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Abstract
Recent experiments suggest that contribution decisions in a public goods game (PGG)
are more likely to be cooperative if based on intuition rather than reflection. This paper
(i) reinvestigates the behavioral impact of so-called cognitive style in the PGG; and (ii)
connects it with an earlier literature on the role of cognitive failure (confusion). This is
motivated by the possibility that the method of time pressure, commonly used to identify
cognitive style, invites confusion as a confounding factor. Two channels for such confounds
are identified and experimentally tested: A heterogeneous treatment effect of time pressure
depending on subject’s confusion status and a direct impact of time pressure on subjects’
likelihood of being confused. Our reinvestigation on the behavioral impact of time pressure
confirms that cognitive style matters, but that deliberation rather than intuition drives
cooperation. The confounding effect of confusion is not found to be direct, but to oper-
ate through a heterogeneous treatment effect. Time pressure selectively reduces average
contributions among those subjects whose contributions can confidently be interpreted as
cooperative rather than confused.
aEmail: goeschl@eco.uni-heidelberg.de. Postal address: Department of Economics, Bergheimer Str. 20,
69115 Heidelberg, Germany.
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1 Introduction
Economists’ understanding of the drivers that underpin cooperation in the public goods game
(PGG) has become increasingly sophisticated over the last twenty years (Ledyard, 1995; Chaud-
huri, 2011; Vesterlund, 2014). Yet, despite the significant progress, it remains far from exhaustive
and not without conflicting findings. As a result, researchers have adopted new conceptual ap-
proaches, some borrowed from psychology or evolutionary biology, as points of departure for
novel experimental designs and new interpretations of existing experimental evidence. Among
the most recent approaches, cognitive style has attracted significant attention as a possible cog-
nitive driver of behavior in the PGG. Cognitive style refers to the type of mental processes that
individuals draw on in order to come to a decision in a given choice situation. In economics,
researchers have started to adopt so-called ‘dual-system’ models, which distinguish between
intuition and deliberation as the two main cognitive styles (Loewenstein and O’ Donoghue,
2007; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Dreber et al., 2014).1 In the context of social dilemmas,
economists’ recent interest in cognitive style as a driver of cooperation has at least three rea-
sons. One is the potential of dual-system theories to provide additional building blocks for
modeling cooperative behavior. A second is the possibility of designing decision environments
that enhance cooperation once the links between cognitive style, cooperative behavior, and the
situational determinants of cognitive style are better understood. A third reason is that differ-
ences in cognitive style could perhaps explain conflicting experimental findings that challenge
existing outcome-based models of other-regarding preferences (Dreber et al., 2014).2
Cognitive factors have at least once before attracted the interest of economists studying subjects’
behavior in the PGG. In his seminal paper, Andreoni (1995) showed that a significant share of
behavior in the PGG that appeared to be cooperation could in fact be traced back to cognitive
failure: Confusion about core elements of the strategic situation was common among subjects
in the PPG. Subsequent research has been able to confirm the important role of confusion
for explaining positive contributions. It has also demonstrated that repeated experiences and
learning can attenuate its impact over time (Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Ferraro and Vossler,
2010; Burton-Chellew and West, 2013; Bayer et al., 2013; Burton-Chellew et al., 2016). In
this paper, we connect the recent literature on cognitive style as an explanation of cooperative
behavior in the PPG with the earlier literature on the role of cognitive failure among subjects
playing that game form. These literatures not only share a common conceptual concern with
cognitive factors in cooperation problems. More importantly, cognitive style and confusion are
connected through the very methods commonly used to identify cognitive style. Because the
cognitive processes involved in choice are not directly observable, researchers are beginning to
collect supplementary non-choice data (Schotter, 2008; Schotter and Trevino, 2014), especially
1Apart from cooperation in the PGG, these models and the associated experiments have also been applied to
other domains such as risky decisions (e.g., Kocher et al., 2013) or inter-temporal choice (e.g., Benjamin et al.,
2013).
2In their paper, Dreber et al. (2014) describe a dual-self model of pro-social behavior that could reconcile some
of these conflicting findings. For instance, standard social preference models cannot explain why a significant
number of individuals chooses to avoid being asked to give, when there is a possibility to do so (Dana et al.,
2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012). This behavior, however, would be consistent with a decision
maker’s deliberate choice to avoid the temptation of impulsive giving (Vesterlund, 2014; Dreber et al., 2014).
Similarly, the difficulty to generalize from some lab results to other regarding behavior in the field (Levitt and
List, 2007) could be due to the higher level of deliberation induced by the unfamiliar experimental environment.
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on response times (Rubinstein, 2007; Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2014), or are putting subjects
under time pressure, thereby exogenously influencing their cognitive style (Rand et al., 2012).
Those and similar methods have been used separately or jointly in studies investigating the role of
cognitive style in explaining outcomes of economic experiments in general and of social dilemma
experiments in particular (Piovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009; Hauge et al., 2009; Fiedler et al.,
2013b; Ubeda, 2014; Grossman et al., 2014; Lohse et al., 2014; Corgnet et al., 2015; Achtziger
et al., 2015). A highly cited example is a series of one-shot PGG experiments (Rand et al., 2012,
2014) in which the researchers found that participants deciding under time pressure contributed
more, on average, than participants deciding in a time delay condition. Their interpretation of
this evidence as proof of a causal link between intuition and cooperation and, more generally, as
support for applying a dual-self model to cooperation problems generated significant attention
in the literature (Ga¨chter, 2012).
If decision speed exclusively correlates with cognitive style, but is unconnected with the presence
of cognitive failure, evidence from time-pressure experiments can be safely interpreted without
reference to economists’ earlier insights on the role of confusion in PGG. But there are at
least two channels through which cognitive failure could conceivably confound the inference
from time pressure experiments. The first channel is a heterogeneous treatment effect of time
pressure on subjects depending on whether they are confused or unconfused about material
aspects of the choice when they come to the decision situation.3 For instance, some subjects
might simply have misread the instructions before they reach the decision screen and hence do
not understand that there is a trade-off between selfish and other-regarding choices. If subjects
respond differently to time pressure depending on their confusion status, then the presence
and sign of the average treatment effect across all subjects, confused and unconfused, could be
misleading. Evidence in favour of selective treatment effects of this kind is found in Strømland
et al. (2016). In the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, different average treatment
effects found across single experiments could well depend on the (unobserved) level of confusion
in each study population, reflecting, for example, demographic composition or the format of the
instructions (Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).
The second confounding channel is the possibility that subjecting participants in experiments
to time pressure affects their likelihood of cognitive failure. Taxing subjects’ deliberative capac-
ities by applying time pressure could plausibly lead to a higher share of confused subjects under
time pressure. Recent correlational evidence indicates that this possibility exists: In Rubinstein
(2013), those subjects who decided faster and were therefore more likely to make an intuitive
choice, were also significantly more likely to choose strictly dominated actions, a clear indicator
of confusion. Similarly, a response time study of Recalde et al. (2014) finds that faster partici-
pants in a non-linear PGG were more likely to contribute at suboptimal levels given their own
preferences. Faster decisions could therefore systematically correlate with the likelihood that the
decider is confused about core features of the decision. While the existing evidence is merely
3From here onwards, we will refer to confusion as a selfish subject’s cognitive failure to understand that
free-riding is his pay-off maximizing strategy. More generally, Chou et al. (2009, p.160) use the term game
form recognition to specify different kinds of cognitive failure. Subjects can be said to display a perfect game
form recognition (i.e. they are unconfused), if they understand ”(1) the sets of strategies available [...], (2) the
information conditions, (3) the relationship between strategy choices and outcomes, and (4) the relationships
between outcomes and payoffs.”
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correlational at this stage, it opens up the possibility that time pressure could in fact cause
participants to become more confused. We conduct a direct test for this causal relationship in
the current paper. If confirmed, higher average contributions under time pressure - as found in
Rand et al. (2012) - could no longer be equated with more cooperation and hence could shed
no light on a link between cognitive style and cooperation.
Against this background, the present paper pursues two objectives. The first is to reinvestigate
the causal link between cognitive style and behavior. We do so by emulating earlier studies
that combine a linear PGG experiment with a time pressure treatment in order to reproduce
the treatment effect of exogenously induced intuition on behavior. Reproducing the treatment
effect and determining its direction is of interest in its own right: While several follow-up studies
to Rand et al. (2012) affirm a positive relationship between intuition and cooperation based on
correlational (Lotito et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2014) or causal evidence (Cone and Rand, 2014;
Rand et al., 2015), a number of other studies find conflicting evidence. For example, Tingho¨g
et al. (2013) and Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) fail to replicate the original findings. Using
a different design, Duffy and Smith (2014) and Martinsson et al. (2014b) also find no evidence for
intuitive cooperation in repeated public good games. A recent meta study (Rand, 2016) reports
a significant positive average effect of intuition on cooperation (of 6.1 percentage points), but
also shows that there are large differences across the single studies covered with many included
studies not finding a significant difference in treatments. These conflicting findings call for more
evidence on the presence and direction of the treatment effect. The second objective of our paper
is to investigate whether one or both of the channels through which confusion among subjects
could theoretically confound the treatment effect of time pressure on behavior is operational.
The nature of the confound matters: Both a heterogeneous treatment effect on confused and
unconfused subjects and a link between time-pressure and the likelihood of confusion would
weaken the existing case for the role of cognitive style in explaining cooperation in PGG. But
while the former would complicate the identification of the desired treatment effect, the latter
would require an entirely new methodological approach.
The empirical strategy of the paper closely follows these two objectives: To meet the first ob-
jective, we follow the existing literature (Rand et al., 2012, 2014) and randomly assign subjects
in a linear PGG either to a baseline condition (BL) in which subjects decide about individual
contribution without a time constraint or to a time pressure (TP) condition in which subjects
must decide within a tight time limit of seven seconds. The subsequent between-subjects com-
parison then identifies the causal impact of time pressure on behavior. The robustness of the
treatment effect to repeat play (Duffy and Smith, 2014; Martinsson et al., 2014b) is examined
through a nine-round repetition run after the one-shot game.
Testing for the potential presence and nature of a confusion confound, our second objective,
requires a treatment design that can overcome the problem that disentangling confusion and
cooperation in a standard PGG is not possible since positive contributions could be driven by
either or both (Andreoni, 1995; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). The design solution proposed
in this paper is to combine, in one experiment, the TP treatment with a treatment that has
been used previously in order to identify confusion in subjects through a behavioral measure
(Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010; Burton-Chellew et al., 2016). This
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treatment retains all features of the linear PGG used in the BL and TP condition, except for one
difference: Instead of interacting with human partners, subjects interact with computer agents
that mechanically contribute a predetermined amount to the public account. The treatment is
called computer condition (CC) to contrast it with the conventional human condition (HC) in
which subjects interact with humans. Researchers have previously employed the CC treatment
to detect confusion on the basis that its design, if understood by the subject, cannot activate
social preferences. When the other party in a PGG is a line of software code drawing on a
sequence of pre-determined contributions, contributing to the “public account” does not generate
any benefits for the human subject or for any other participant (Houser and Kurzban, 2002;
Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).4 Each subject, whether randomly assigned to the TP or the BL
treatment, completes both the HC and the CC, controlling for order effects. This combination
of between-subjects and within-subject treatments allows to identify the treatment effect of time
pressure on behavior as well as the presence and nature of a confusion confound.
Our results are twofold. First, our reinvestigation on decision speed affirms that time pressure
does affect behavior in the linear PGG with human partners (the HC). The direction of the
effect, however, is the opposite of the findings by Rand et al. (2012), Cone and Rand (2014),
and Rand et al. (2015) and supports the insignificant results of Tingho¨g et al. (2013) and
Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014): Comparing the BL and the TP conditions in the HC, we
find that time pressure significantly increases the share of zero contributors and weakly decreases
average contributions. This speaks against the conclusion that intuitive cognitive style favors
cooperative behavior. The finding that faster subjects contribute significantly less to the public
account is highly robust to potential selection effects.
Second, our evidence confirms that some, but not all concerns that the TP treatment effect
could be confounded by confusion are justified. The nature of the confusion confound is a
heterogeneous treatment effect only. In particular, contrary to the concerns raised in Recalde
et al. (2014), we do not find that the method of using time pressure to induce a more intuitive
cognitive style has the undesired effect of increasing cognitive failure, thereby confounding the
true treatment effect. Time pressure itself does not affect the likelihood of cognitive failure,
measured by positive contributions in the CC. On the other hand, there is a confound through
a heterogeneous treatment effect, which derives its substance from the high share of confused
subjects: In the CC, nearly 50 percent of subjects contribute a positive amount to the public
account. Exploiting the within-subjects design to identify confused subjects, we find that time
4Altruism towards the experiment could be one rival explanation for why subjects contribute in the computer
condition. However, Ferraro and Vossler (2010) test whether subjects are motivated to transfer some of their
endowment back to the experimenter and dismiss this rival explanation based on two observations: First providing
a pay-off table reduced the frequency of positive (confused) contributions in their computer condition from 60
percent of subjects in the baseline to 15 percent in the condition with a pay-off table. Such variation should not
occur if subjects were largely unconfused and were simply using the computer condition in order to return some
money to the experimenter out of generosity. Second, in ex-post focus group interviews none of their subjects
mentioned ’giving back to the experimenter’ as a prime motive for contributing in the computer condition.
Instead, most answers referred to ’problems to locate the optimal strategy’ or ’splitting the endowment’ because
they were uncertain what would be optimal. This is well in line with the different answers we observe in our
ex-post survey in which we asked subjects to state their reasons for contributing in the computer condition.
Apart from altruism towards the experimenter Ferraro and Vossler (2010) also discuss and discard other rival
explanations that cannot be ruled out by design alone such as the idea that subjects do not understand they
are matched with a computer or the idea that subjects understand they are matched with a computer but still
behave as if they were matched with a human.
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pressure in the HC selectively affects only those subjects whose contributions can confidently be
interpreted as cooperative: The reduction of average contributions under TP, weakly significant
in the full sample, becomes highly significant when we restrict the sample to control for cognitive
failure and compliance with the time limit. This heterogeneous treatment effect could be a key
explanation why our reinvestigation of the TP treatment effect, along with those of others,
fails to replicate and possibly contradict the earlier findings of the role of cognitive style on
cooperation. These main findings on the effects of time pressure continue to hold when we move
from a one-shot to a repeated setting, in which subjects can gain more experience with the task
format. In sum, our results suggest that those contributions which can safely be interpreted as
cooperative are rather the product of deliberation than intuition.
In the next section we describe the experimental design in more detail. Section 3 spells out our
main results. We conclude in section 4 with a discussion and implications.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Basic Setup
The experimental design combines treatments to identify confused decisions with treatments
that speed up decision-making. To disentangle confusion from social preferences we compare
two different public good conditions, closely following the design of Houser and Kurzban (2002).
In the human condition (HC) participants were randomly and anonymously matched into groups
of four to participate in a standard PGG. Each participant could decide how to divide an initial
endowment (v) of 20 tokens between a private and a public account. A token was worth e 0.20
in the private account and contributions (x) to the public account lead to a payoff of e 0.10
for all subjects in the group. In other words, each token contributed to the public account
was doubled in value (e 0.40) and was then split evenly among four group member so that the
marginal per capita return (MPCR) equals 0.5. Hence, free-riding is a dominant strategy while
full contributions maximize the payoff of the group as a whole. Equation (1) summarizes the
linear payoff function for subject i.
pii = 0.2(v − xi) + 0.1(
∑3
j
xj + xi) ∀i 6= j (1)
Positive deviations from this dominant strategy have been attributed to social preferences (e.g.,
Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010), but also to confusion (Andreoni, 1995; Houser and Kurzban,
2002; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).
The computer condition (CC), retains all features of the HC with the only difference that the
gains from cooperating are removed: Subjects shared their public account with a computer
program instead of human interaction partners. Retaining the same basic payoff structure,
subjects lost e 0.10 for each token contributed without generating additional gains for a group
of other participants, as the computer agents did not receive any payoff. Thus, contributions
in this condition cannot be attributed to cooperative preferences. Employing this behavioral
measure of confusion is central to our design, as it enables us to observe the direct effect of time
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pressure on the level of confusion, at the moment of decision making. In contrast, an ex-post
survey measure would not capture the full effect, as subjects by then would have had additional
time to understand the incentives. To analyze the effect of constraining deliberation, the HC
and CC were each conducted both in a baseline setting (BL) with unconstrained decision time
and under time pressure (TP). Time pressure was randomly assigned between-subjects. In total
we compare four different combinations of treatments: HC-BL, HC-TP, CC-BL or CC-TP.
To assess the individual confusion status needed in a test for heterogeneous treatment effects,
we add a within-subjects dimension to the design of Houser and Kurzban (2002). Each subject
was observed in one of the HC and in the corresponding CC, controlling for order effects. Under
normal order (NO) the first task was in the HC, while under reverse order (RO) subjects began
in the CC. In both order conditions subjects were informed that there would be a second task,
but were uninformed about the specifics of this second task. In order to compare our results
to other studies in the literature, we are primarily interested in the outcomes of the one-shot
PGGs. However, to assess the role of confusion over time we also conduct a repeated public good
game in which subjects are given a possibility to gain additional experience. In each treatment
condition subjects also interacted in nine rounds of a repeated public good game with feedback.
While subjects knew that they would take additional decisions, the specifics of the repeated
protocol were only revealed after the one-shot game. Table 1 summarizes the succession of the
different tasks and the corresponding sample sizes. Each condition is described in more detail
below.
Table 1: Treatment conditions and order
Normal Order Reverse Order
Baseline Time Pressure Baseline Time Pressure
First Task (HC-BL) (HC-TP) (CC-BL) (CC-TP)
One-Shot One-Shot One-Shot One-Shot
Repeated Repeated Repeated Repeated
Second Task (CC-BL) (CC-TP) (HC-BL) (HC-TP)
One-Shot One-Shot One-Shot One-Shot
Repeated Repeated Repeated Repeated
Sample Size N=108 N=112 N=64 N=64
2.2 Computer Condition (CC-BL & CC-TP)
Our behavioral measure of confusion replicates all central elements of the Houser and Kurzban
(2002) design. We slightly deviate from their design in the following two aspects: We provide no
payoff table in the instructions or on the decision screen in order to rule out that differences in
information seeking interact with the effects of time pressure. Furthermore, in each round of the
repeated CC subjects did not receive feedback about the actions of the three computer agents
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prior to, but after stating their own decision in this round. We altered this feature to make
the CC more comparable to the HC. Subjects in the CC received the same set of instructions
explaining the payoff structure of the standard public good game as subjects in the HC. The
only difference was that CC subjects were explicitly informed that their group would consist
of three computer agents who (naturally, as they are a computer program) would not receive
any payoffs generated through contributions to the public account. On each decision screen we
reminded participants of this fact.
To exclude other reasons for contributing in the CC, it is essential that subjects understand
the difference between human and computerized interaction partners. Particularly, they should
not wrongly assume that the computer was programmed to react to their contribution choices.
Therefore, we instructed subjects that the computer agents would contribute predetermined
amounts. In order to make this information credible, contributions were written on a concealed
poster in the room prior to the experiment and were revealed to subjects at the end of their
session. This procedure was described in the instructions before subjects could make any deci-
sion. A manipulation check based on two questionnaire items confirms that 92 percent of the
subjects understood that they had interacted with a computer program and 93 percent believed
that they were not able to influence the computer’s contribution.
2.3 Time pressure (HC-TP & CC-TP)
In the one-shot decision of the time pressure treatments, subjects had to decide within seven
seconds. This is a slightly stricter limit than in Rand et al. (2012, 2014) and Tingho¨g et al.
(2013). In the later rounds of the repeated tasks (5-9) the limit was tightened to four seconds,
to account for the possibility that subjects adapt to the time constraint. These limits were con-
structed by subtracting one standard deviation from mean decision time in the first two sessions
of the baseline condition. In accordance with the existing literature, subjects were informed
about the time constraint only after going through all instructions, right before reaching the
decision screen. This procedure prevents subjects in the time pressure condition from changing
their behavior on the instruction screen in anticipation of the time constraint. On the decision
screen a counter displayed the remaining decision time. There are different approaches, how
to deal with the possibility that subjects violate the time limit. One alternative would be a
binding constraint, which shuts down the decision screen after reaching the time limit and au-
tomatically chooses a default contribution. We decided against a binding limit as this would
complicate the game structure, by adding the option of strategic inaction for subjects in the TP
condition. Instead, subjects could violate the time constraint. However, to reduce statistical
problems associated with non-compliance (Tingho¨g et al., 2013), we introduced an incentive.
For each violation of the time constraint subjects lost e 0.20 of their show-up fee. For similar
reasons, previous studies on cognitive load in economic games (including cooperation games)
have also incentivised compliance (Cappelletti et al., 2011; Carpenter et al., 2013; Duffy and
Smith, 2014). While no incentives were used in the original study by Rand et al. (2012) and
hence their introduction might affect direct comparability of the treatment effects, we decided in
favor of incentives given the high rate of non-compliance and the associated statistical problems
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in their original study.5
2.4 One-shot and repeated decisions
The majority of studies analyzing the effects of time pressure in public good games were con-
ducted in a one-shot environment. To allow for a comparison with these studies, the first decision
in our experiment is one-shot as well in the sense that there was no feedback given regarding
the choices of other group members.Subjects were also informed at this point that they would
receive a new set of rules after their first decision that would only apply to further decisions.
Experience could play an important role in reducing initial confusion. Therefore, we conduct a
repeated version of the same PGG subsequent to the one-shot task. While subjects knew that
they would take further decisions in the experiment, they only learned about the specifics of
the repeated decisions after stating their choice in the one-shot game. Specifically, they were
instructed that there would be nine consecutive rounds within a fixed group of subjects and
that they would receive feedback after each round. Between each decision screen there was a
feedback screen displaying the total contributions of their group members. To keep BL and
TP comparable, in both conditions the feedback screen was only available for ten seconds after
which the next decision screen appeared automatically.
2.5 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Heidelberg “AWI–LAB” between Decem-
ber 2012 and November 2013. We ran twenty-six sessions with sixteen or twelve subjects per
session for a total of 348 participants. The participants were recruited from a standard subject
pool of undergraduate and graduate students and randomly assigned to the different treatment
conditions. The subjects were from mixed disciplines, including economics (34%). There was
a nearly balanced ratio of female (53%) to male (47%) participants.6 Using ORSEE (Greiner,
2004), subjects who had previously taken part in a public goods experiment at the “AWI–
LAB” were excluded from recruitment to the experiment. No participant took part in more
than one session of the experiment and all sessions were run by the same experimenter. Upon
arrival, participants were seated at their computer terminal, generated a random password to
ensure their anonymity and received a set of general instructions that were read aloud by the
experimenter. All other instructions were fully computerized. The decision tasks were imple-
mented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). During the experiment subjects were only allowed to
ask questions in private. Participants were not allowed to communicate with one another. After
the decision task, subjects had to complete a set of demographic survey questions and two stan-
dardized psychological tests to measure their predisposition for cognitive reflection (Frederick,
2005) and their working memory span (Wechsler, 1955). Furthermore, they were asked to an-
swer an incentivised comprehension question in which they had to state their payoff maximizing
5Also note that the cost violating the time constraint are relatively small. Compared to the actual incentives
in the public good game they correspond to one token in the private account. This renders an effect on behavior
in the PGG unlikely. For a more extensive discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of incentivising
compliance in cognitive load tasks see Duffy and Smith (2014)
6Further summary statistics are contained in Table 9 of the Appendix.
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strategy and a set of control questions.7 At the end of the experiment, participants were paid
their earnings from one randomly drawn round and task in private. All sessions lasted approx-
imately 75 minutes and participants earned an average of e 9.51 (Min.:e 4.80;Max.:e 15.00),
including a show-up fee of e 3.
3 Results
We first discuss results from those one-shot PGGs, subjects encountered first in each condition
(i.e., NO-HC and RO-CC). These outcomes are directly comparable to the evidence in Rand
et al. (2012, 2014), Tingho¨g et al. (2013), and Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014). We then
proceed with the evidence from the reverse order condition and the repeated games to explore
the role of experience and strategic interaction.
3.1 One-shot decisions
In Figure 1 we display the effect of time pressure on the distribution of contributions for those
subjects making their very first choice in the HC (gray bars: HC-BL vs. black bars: HC-
TP).8 Despite reproducing essential elements of the design of Rand et al. (2012), Figure 1
does not support their conclusion regarding a tendency to cooperate instinctively in one-shot
public good games. Instead, we find a higher incidence of free-riding (BL: 12%; TP: 22%) and
a slightly reduced fraction of full contributions (BL: 30%; TP: 25%) in the treatment group.
Furthermore, the higher fraction of subjects who split their endowment equally between both
accounts under time pressure (BL: 11%; TP: 22%) could either indicate increased confusion
(Ledyard, 1995; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010) or point towards a fairness heuristic (Roch et al.,
2000; Cappelen et al., 2014; Capraro et al., 2014). A comparison of mean behavior corroborates
these first observations. In the baseline, subjects on average contribute 56 percent of their
endowment, which falls into the range typically observed for public good games (Ledyard, 1995).
Contributions in the treatment condition are lower, at an average of 47 percent. This difference
is weakly significant (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=1.66, p=0.097) at the ten percent level. We
reach an even stronger conclusion, when restricting our analysis to the most extreme forms
of defection or cooperation. Time pressure significantly increases free-riding (Chi2: χ2=4.07,
p=0.044) while it does not affect the fraction of subjects who contribute their full endowment
(Chi2: χ2=0.85, p=0.357). These results are robust to controlling for additional demographic
(age, sex, risk aversion, correct answer to control question) and psychometric (time spent reading
the instructions, test scores from cognitive reflection test, and working memory test) variables,
as shown by multiple regressions in Table 8 of the Appendix. Taken together, we therefore reject
the hypothesis of intuitive cooperation and state the following result:
7Some of the subjects (N=96) answered these control questions as part of their demographic survey, while
others answered them as part of the instructions (N=252). As we find no differences in one-shot contributions,
both with (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=0.213, p=0.831) and without applying time pressure (M.W. Rank Sum
Test: z=-0.082, p=0.935), we pool observations for the analyses below.
8Remember that these subjects were assigned to the normal order condition, so that behavior cannot be
influenced by the subsequent tasks.
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Figure 1: Distribution of contributions HC
Notes: This graph shows the distribution of contributions to the public account
separately for subjects in the baseline and under time-pressure. Gray bars are
used for BL subjects and black bars for TP-subjects. Data from the normal
order condition only.
Result 1: There is no evidence for a greater tendency to contribute to the public
account under time pressure. Instead, time pressure significantly increases the
incidence of zero contributions and weakly decreases average contributions.
As expected, time pressure induces subjects in the treatment condition to spend significantly
less time on the first decision screen (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=10.48, p<0.001). Median re-
sponse times are 16 seconds in the BL and 7 seconds in the TP condition.9 However, only 57.2
percent of subjects under time pressure make their decision within the set time limit, whereas
7.4 percent of subjects in the baseline decide within seven seconds. Decisions from subjects who
chose to spend more time on the decision screen are less informative for identifying the effects of
intuition (Myrseth and Wollbrant, 2015). Consequently, the more conservative intention-to-treat
effect of forced intuition (i.e., the effect of treatment assignment) we report above corresponds
to a weighted average of the zero (or reduced) effect on non-compliers and the true treatment
effect on compliers (Bloom, 1984). In other words, it most likely understates the true impact of
constraining deliberation. Therefore, we now adjust previous results for compliance. When we
simply compare fast subjects (response times 6 7 seconds) to slow subjects (response times > 7
seconds) the negative effect of constrained deliberation on the size of contributions as well as on
the probability to contribute at all, increases in size and significance. Fast subjects contribute
40 percent of their endowment and slow subjects 57 percent (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=3.11,
9These values are computed for subjects in the normal order condition. An overview over the full distribution
of response times across all treatment conditions is given in Table 7 of the Appendix.
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Table 2: Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of fast decision making in the human condition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contributions Contributions Free-Riding Free-Riding
Panel A: Second Stage (DV: Contributions) HC HC HC HC
Response Time (Log10 Sec.) 3.654** 4.164*** -0.441*** -0.489***
(2.36) (2.71) (-2.67) (-2.81)
Age (Years) -0.224 -0.009
(-0.81) (-0.26)
Sex (1=Male) 3.510** -0.139
(2.45) (-0.85)
Risk Aversion (1-11) 0.214 -0.003
(0.70) (-0.09)
Unconfused (1=Yes) -2.192 0.240
(-1.48) (1.45)
Cognitive Reflection Score (0-3) 1.965*** 0.045
(2.90) (0.60)
Readingtime Instructions (Log10 Sec.) 3.104* -0.048
(1.84) (-0.24)
Working Memory Score (0-12) 0.230 -0.042
(0.59) (-1.04)
Constant 2.209 -10.36 0.102 0.632
(0.63) (-1.05) (0.28) (0.53)
Observations 348 335 348 335
Panel B: First Stage (DV: Response Time)
Treatment(I): Normal Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -0.855**** -0.814**** -0.855**** -0.814****
(-12.49) (-11.78) (-12.49) (-11.78)
Treatment(II): Reverse Order (1=Yes) -0.583**** -0.610**** -0.583**** -0.610****
(-6.67) (-7.36) (-6.67) (-7.36)
Treatment(III): Reverse Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -1.324**** -1.327**** -1.324**** -1.327****
(-16.93) (-15.77) (-16.93) (-15.77)
Age (Years) -0.001 -0.001
(-0.12) (-0.12)
Sex (1=Male) -0.019 -0.019
(-0.36) (-0.36)
Risk Aversion (1-11) 0.005 0.004
(0.37) (0.37)
Unconfused (1=Yes) 0.068 0.068
(1.25) (1.25)
Cognitive Reflection Score (0-3) -0.029 -0.029
(-1.18) (-1.18)
Readingtime Instructions (Log10 Sec.) 0.243**** 0.243****
(3.44) (3.43)
Working Memory Score (0-12) -0.027** -0.027**
(-2.16) (-2.16)
Constant 2.830**** 2.167**** 2.829**** 2.167****
(48.84) (6.18) (48.71) (6.18)
F-Statistic First Stage 108.66 34.84 108.66 34.84
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: Specifications (1) and (2): Tobit-IV maximum likelihood estimation to account
for censoring from below (0) and above (20). Specifications (3)-(4): Probit-IV maximum
likelihood estimation. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors. Estimates
for the pooled sample. Treatment effects are robust to using the following alternative
specifications: using only observations from the normal order condition, using OLS instead
of Tobit, using a dummy variable for fast decisions (response times either <= 5 or <= 7
seconds) instead of a continuous response time variable, using time pressure as the only
instrument. The natural logarithm of response times is used to give less weight to outliers.
Alternatively, excluding these outliers leads to equivalent results.
p<0.01). Similarly, 31 percent of fast subjects free-ride as compared to 10 percent of slow sub-
jects (Chi2: χ2=16.12, p<0.001). Before this result can stand, the analysis needs to account for
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potential selection effects, since fast and slow subjects might differ in observable or unobservable
ways (Tingho¨g et al., 2013). The data generated by our experiment do not point towards the
presence of selection bias on the basis of observed characteristics.10 The only exception could be
working memory capacity which is significantly higher for fast subjects (M.W. Rank Sum Test:
z=-4.63, p<0.001), but which is already at increased levels for subjects randomized to the TP
condition (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=-2.88, p<0.01). There is, however, still the possibility that
some unobservable subject characteristic is correlated with both response times and contribution
behavior. To account for potential problems resulting from self-selection, we follow Imbens and
Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996) and use assignment to one of the treatment conditions
as an instrument for potentially endogenous response times. By design, treatment assignment
is random and hence truly exogenous, while still being highly correlated with faster decisions.
Table 2 displays estimates from four instrumental variable regressions. Tobit regressions (1) and
(2) take contributions as the dependent variable, probit regressions (3) and (4) the decision to
free-ride or not. First stage regressions (Panel B) show that random assignment to treatment
significantly decreases response times in each case relative to the unconstrained baseline. Fur-
thermore, two psychometric variables are correlated with fast decision making. Subjects with
a higher working memory capacity and subjects who spend less time reading the instructions
make faster choices on the actual decision screen. Plausibly, a better ability to remember the
details of the task speed up decision making. Second stage regressions in Panel A show the
main effect of interest. Across specifications (1)–(4) faster decisions lead to significantly lower
contributions and significantly more free-riding. Thus, adjusting for potential selection-bias, IV
results confirm a positive effect of more deliberation on contributions: a ten percent increase of
time spent on the decision screen increases contributions by 0.35 tokens. This positive link is
robust to controlling for additional demographic and psychometric variables in regressions (2)
and (4). Male subjects contribute significantly more. Confusion status, assessed by a simple
survey question is not correlated with contribution behavior. Yet, two of the included psycho-
metric variables are related to the experimental outcome. The amount of time subjects spend on
the instructions screen is included as a general measure of their engagement and reading speed.
Furthermore, it could be related to the amount and kind of information subjects acquire when
reading the instructions. It has been shown (Fiedler et al., 2013b) that subjects who care more
about the payoffs of other participants acquire more information about the payoff structure and
consequently might spend more time on reading the instructions. This interpretation would be
in line with the weakly positive relationship shown in regression (2). Subjects could also differ
in their propensity to rely on their intuition. We control for these differences by scores from a
cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005). In line with the main treatment effect we find
that subjects who are more prone to rely on a deliberative cognitive style, as measured by the
CRT, contribute more to the public good.11 Both psychometric measures are not associated
with the rate of free-riding (4).
10An overview over subject characteristics by treatment and compliance status is given in Table 9 of the
Appendix.
11In a companion paper (Lohse, 2014) we explore and interpret this relationship more thoroughly using parts
of the same dataset.
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Figure 2: Contribution Frequencies CC
Notes: This graph shows the distribution of contributions to the public account
in the computer condition (RO) separately for subjects in the baseline and
under time-pressure. Gray bars are used for BL subjects and black bars for
TP-subjects.
Result 2: Faster subjects contribute significantly less to the public account than
slower subjects. After controlling for potential selection effects, we still find support
for a causal link between more deliberation and higher contributions.
We continue by analyzing choices of those participants who took their first one-shot decision
in the computer condition (CC). Figure 2 compares the distribution of CC contributions from
the reverse order condition between subjects in the baseline and subjects in the time pressure
condition. Thus, it illustrates how constraining the use of a reflective cognitive style affects
behavior in a situation of comparable complexity to the HC, but in which gains from cooperation
cannot motivate behavior. Time pressure only slightly increases the occurrence of confused
contributions: fewer participants stick to their dominant strategy of contributing zero tokens
(BL: 50%; TP: 47%), whereas there are more participants who give up half of (BL: 12%; TP:
19%) or even their full (BL: 11%; TP: 17%) endowment. None of these differences reaches
statistic significance at conventional levels. This continues to hold when we adjust results
for compliance with the time constraint. Fast subjects are neither significantly less likely to
contribute zero (Chi2: χ2=0.04 p = 0.851), nor do they contribute more on average (M.W. Rank
Sum Test: z=-0.55, p = 0.584).12 Therefore, in contrast to the concerns raised by correlational
evidence in Racalde et al. (2014), we conclude that taxing participants’ deliberative capacities
by applying time pressure does not increase confusion levels in our setting.
12Results from the corresponding IV regressions confirm this finding and are available on request.
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Result 3: In the one-shot CC, we observe no effect of time-pressure on contribu-
tions.
As in Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Ferraro and Vossler (2010), approximately half of the
participants in the CC contribute positive amounts, despite the fact that this reduces their
own payoffs without benefiting any other group member. This substantial presence of confusion
could complicate the interpretation of the link between contributions and cooperation. Only for
subjects who show no sign of confusion in the computer condition a treatment effect in the HC
can confidently be attributed to a change in cooperative behavior. Furthermore, time pressure
could affect subjects selectively by confusion status. We exploit the within-subjects structure
of our data to devise two different tests for these potential concerns.
In our test for heterogeneous treatment effects we split the sample into “confused” and “un-
confused” subjects. We do so by sorting a participant into the “confused” bin if we observe
positive contributions in the one-shot game of the CC and into the “unconfused” bin if we ob-
serve zero contributions. Note that this classification is conservative in the following sense: At
the point where subjects make their first contribution choice in the computer condition (normal
order) they will already have made ten choices in the preceding human condition. Hence, they
have already gained some experience with the task that might have resolved some of their initial
confusion. Thus, our classification constitutes a lower bound of the actual confusion present
during the first decision in the HC. Panels A and B of Figure 3 compare the effect of time
pressure on contributions between subjects in the “confused” and “unconfused” bins.13 Two
observations stand out clearly: First, for baseline subjects the distribution of contributions dif-
fers by their confusion status. None of the confused subjects contribute zero tokens. Confused
subjects are not more cooperative in general, as they are also less prone to contribute their full
endowment. Instead, they more frequently choose a contribution from within the contribution
range.14 Overall, the average contributions of confused subjects are significantly higher than for
unconfused ones (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=-3.06, p<0.01). Second, the effect of time pressure
appears to work in opposite directions, by confusion status. For unconfused subjects time pres-
sure increases free-riding and decreases full contributions. For confused subjects time pressure
slightly increases full contributions.
When testing for a heterogeneous treatment effect, we find time pressure to reduce average
contributions only among unconfused subjects. This effect gets stronger when we adjust results
for compliance to time pressure. On average, fast subjects contribute significantly less (fast:
34.6%; slow: 52.8%) if unconfused (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=2.99, p<0.01), but approximately
the same average amount if confused (M.W. Rank Sum Test: z=0.13, p=0.89). Instrumental
variable regressions in Table 3 confirm that these results are not driven by selection effects.
Specifications (1) and (2) contain estimates for unconfused subjects. Potentially endogenous
response times (1) or a dummy indicating fast decisions below seven seconds (2) are again
13We display results for the normal order condition to allow for a clean comparison to Figure 1. Results,
however, do not differ, when using pooled data.
14Remember, intermediary contributions are not consistent with the predictions of many standard social pref-
erence models, which posit that decision makers either contribute nothing or their full endowment, depending
on the strength of their other-regarding concerns. Therefore, it would not be surprising if intermediary contri-
butions were more common among confused participants, who might mistakenly think that contributing half of
the endowment equalizes payoffs.
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Figure 3: Distribution of contributions by confusion status
Notes: This graph shows the distribution of contributions to the public account
separately for subjects in the baseline and under time-pressure using observa-
tions from the normal order condition. Gray bars are used for BL subjects and
black bars for TP subjects.
instrumented by exogenous treatment assignment. In both specifications faster decisions lead
to significantly lower contributions. In contrast, specifications (3) and (4) show that subjects
classified as confused are largely unaffected by their decision speed. Those who decide within
seven seconds (4) do not differ from slower decision makers in their contribution behavior. The
effect for a continuous response time variable (3) remains weakly significant, but is quantitatively
much smaller that the corresponding effect (1) for unconfused subjects. These findings are robust
to switching to a more regressive criterion by which we sort participants into the “confused” bin.
When only sorting subjects into the “confused” bin, because they were unable to identify the
strategy that would have maximized their own payoff in a control question and additionally
made a positive contribution in the CC, we again find that time pressure selectively affects
unconfused subjects. From these observations we state the following result:
Result 4: Those subjects who both understand the incentive structure and decide
fast under time pressure can be said to cooperate less. Those giving reason to doubt
whether they understand the incentive structure of the PGG are largely unaffected
by time pressure
Overall, our results from the one-shot games show that constraining deliberation by applying
time pressure reduces contributions to the public account. Contrary to our initial expectations,
we do not find time pressure to directly increase confusion in the CC. However, there is evidence
that time pressure selectively affects participants who display no signs of confusion in the CC.
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Table 3: Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of fast decision making separated by confusion
status
Unconfused Confused
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contributions Contributions Contributions Contributions
Second Stage (DV: Contributions)
Response Time (Log10 Sec.) 7.864** 2.495*
(2.23) (1.74)
Response Time 5 7 Sec. (1=Yes) -12.190** -4.030
(-2.29) (-1.56)
Age (Years) -0.455 -0.278 -0.053 -0.043
(-0.74) (-0.45) (-0.21) (-0.17)
Sex (1=Male) 4.789 5.170* 3.421** 3.401**
(1.53) (1.65) (2.54) (2.50)
Risk Aversion (1-11) -0.240 -0.311 0.464* 0.506*
(-0.35) (-0.47) (1.76) (1.86)
Cognitive Reflection Score (0-3) 2.945* 2.578* 1.956*** 1.882***
(1.80) (1.67) (3.20) (3.04)
Readingtime Instructions (Log10 Sec.) 4.846 5.761 1.210 1.645
(1.31) (1.60) (0.82) (1.10)
Working Memory Score (0-12) 0.704 0.954 0.085 0.197
(0.80) (1.09) (0.25) (0.50)
Constant -26.10 -10.96 -3.942 0.982
(-1.21) (-0.54) (-0.45) (0.12)
Observations 170 170 165 165
First Stage F-Statistic 19.40 12.12 19.03 14.33
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: Tobit-IV maximum likelihood estimation to account for censoring from
below (0) and above (20). Specifications (1)-(2): subjects classified as uncon-
fused. Specifications (3)-(4): subjects classified as confused. t-statistics in
parentheses. Robust standard errors. Estimates for the pooled sample. First
stage available on request.
This points towards one potential explanation why we, in line with Tingho¨g et al. (2013) and
Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014), fail to replicate evidence on an intuitive predisposition
towards cooperation (Rand et al., 2012, 2014). In other words, for those subjects for which con-
tributions can be safely equated with cooperation, because they do not show signs of confusion
in the CC, our results suggest that reflection and not intuition is driving cooperative behavior.
3.2 Repeated Decisions
Subsequent to each one-shot decision, participants remained in their assigned treatment condi-
tions (HC-BL, HC-TP, CC-BL, CC-TP) and took decisions in nine rounds of a finitely repeated
PGG. Therefore, in total, every participant completed two distinct repeated PGG, one in the
human and one in the corresponding computer condition (compare Table 1). Prior to taking
their first decision, participants were instructed that they would receive feedback regarding the
total contributions of the other three group members (predetermined total contributions of the
three computer agents) at the end of each round. Based on the additional observations from
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the repeated games we explore two issues which have not been addressed in the previous litera-
ture on time pressure in the PGG: First, by comparing aggregate behavior across the different
conditions, we assess the persistence of treatment effects to repetition. Second, analyzing the
evolution of individual decisions across different rounds, we evaluate how confusion, experience,
and time pressure interact to shape strategic behavior.
Table 4: Contributions averaged over nine rounds across treatment conditions
(I) Normal Order (II) Reverse Order
Baseline Time Pressure Baseline Time Pressure
First Repeated Public Good Game HC-BL (N=108) HC-TP (N=112) CC-BL (N=64) CC-TP (N=64)
Contribution Average (% of endowment) (s.d.) 0.52 (0.28) 0.41 (0.27) 0.18 (0.21) 0.20 (0.22)
Second Repeated Public Good Game CC-BL (N=108) CC-TP (N=112) HC-BL (N=64) HC-TP(N=64)
Contribution Average (%of endowment) (s.d.) 0.16 (0.21) 0.15 (0.21) 0.35 (0.31) 0.42 (0.31)
Table 4 contains summary statistics on contribution rates averaged over all rounds. Between-
subjects comparisons suggest that the treatment effects in the one-shot games are robust to
repetition. The top row summarizes decisions from those repeated games which subjects en-
countered first under each condition. Consequently, subjects in these games have only been
exposed to a limited amount of experience by deciding in the preceding one-shot game. We
continue to find a significantly negative effect of time pressure in the HC (Group-level M.W.
Rank Sum Test: z=2.20, p = 0.028) and no significant effect in the CC (Group-level M.W. Rank
Sum Test: z=-0.62, p = 0.534). Moving to the second repeated games (i.e., more experienced
subjects) displayed in the bottom row, time pressure does neither affect average contributions
in the HC (Group-level M.W. Rank Sum Test: z= -0.68, p = 0.498), nor in the CC (Group-level
M.W. Rank Sum Test: z= 0.24, p = 0.814). Irrespective of task order, average contributions
in the CC are significantly smaller than average contributions in the HC and overall confusion
accounts for up to 40 percent of all tokens contributed in the human condition. This is slightly
below the rates of confusion reported in Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Ferraro and Vossler
(2010).
Figure 4 displays the evolution of average contributions (as a fraction of endowment) over time
for each of the four conditions conducted under normal task order. Panel A shows contribu-
tions in the human condition (First Task: HC-BL and HC-TP), Panel B contributions in the
subsequent computer condition (Second Task: CC-BL and CC-TP). Across all four conditions,
contributions exhibit the typical convergence towards the equilibrium. In the HC the share of
zero contributions nearly doubles from 23 percent in the first round to 41 percent in the final
round. At this lower level of aggregation we continue to find no evidence for intuitive coopera-
tion: participants under time pressure contribute less in each of the nine rounds and converge
towards equilibrium at a comparable speed. Irrespective of time pressure, we observe no pro-
nounced end-game effects in the last round. Moving to the CC, there is again no evidence, that
time pressure affects the level of confusion. In the first round 46 percent of subject contribute a
positive amount compared to 25 percent in the last round. The decline of contributions is steeper
in the HC than in the CC. This lends support to the interpretation that declining contributions
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Figure 4: Round-wise average contributions (Normal Order)
in the CC mostly represent a reduction of confusion, while declining contributions in the HC
could additionally be due to “frustrated attempts” (Andreoni, 1995, p.892) at unreciprocated
cooperation.
Figure 5 displays the contribution patterns for the four conditions conducted in reverse task
order. In Panel A we show average contributions from the computer condition (First Task: CC-
BL and CC-TP) and in Panel B contributions from the subsequent human condition (Second
Task: HC-BL and HC-TP). For subjects taking their first repeated decisions in the CC we
continue to find no evidence for increased confusion under time pressure or a slower convergence
towards zero contributions. However, consistent with learning, the initial level of confused
contributions is higher and the subsequent decline steeper than in the corresponding rounds from
the CC conducted under normal order. Similarly, subjects deciding in the HC after completing
the CC start at a lower level of contributions when there is no time limit. A significant restart
effect between the CC and the HC suggests, that learning accounts only partially for the decline
of contributions (Andreoni, 1988). Finally, in the HC there is no significant difference in average
contributions between subjects in the baseline and subjects under timer pressure. Thus, subjects
who are more familiar with the task and the time pressure manipulation display neither an
intuitive tendency to cooperate or to defect.
Random effects regressions in Table 5 confirm the observations from Figures 4 and 5, when
pooling data across both task orders. Regressions (1) and (2) display results from the HC, using
individual contributions in round t as the dependent variable. Regressions (3) and (4) similarly
model contribution behavior in the CC. In each specification subjects from the normal order
condition serve as the left-out baseline category, against which we compare behavior in the other
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Figure 5: Round-wise average contributions (Reverse Order)
three randomly assigned treatment conditions. Regressions (1) and (2) show that applying
time pressure significantly reduces contributions in the normal order condition of the HC. Fur-
thermore, exogenously increasing subjects experience by assigning them to the reverse order
condition reduces contributions: the coefficients of both the Treatment(II) and Treatment(III)
dummies are negative and significant. However, applying time pressure under reverse order
does not further reduce contributions.15 In the CC there is little evidence that the different
treatment conditions affect contribution behavior. Only inexperienced subjects deciding under
time pressure (Treatment(III): Reverse Order + Time Pressure) display marginally increased
contribution levels. The decline in contributions is captured by the Round variable, which is
negative and significant across all specifications - as typical for public good games. The decline
is steeper in the HC than in the CC. To test for potential end-game effects we include an addi-
tional dummy variable indicating the last round, which is insignificant, both in the HC and CC.
Finally, by including interaction terms in regressions (2) and (4) we analyze, if deciding under
a time limit or deciding in the reverse order condition affects the decay of contributions. One
plausible hypothesis would be that constraining deliberation via time pressure negatively affects
the rate of learning, because subjects can invest lower cognitive efforts to understand the game
form or the behavior of their group members. We find no support for this hypothesis in the
HC. Despite constraining deliberation via time pressure or giving subjects additional experience
in the reverse order conditions, contributions decline at comparable speeds. In the CC there
15This can be verified by comparing the size of the coefficients of Treatment(II) and Treatment(III). A Wald
test fails to reject the hypothesis that they are the same (Chi2: χ2=0.22 p=0.6383). The same conclusion can
be drawn from an alternative specification including interaction terms between a time pressure and an order
dummy or by estimating separate regressions for observations from the normal and reverse order condition.
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Table 5: Repeated decisions: Decay of contributions HC and CC
Human Condition (HC) Computer Condition (CC)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contributions Contributions Contributions Contributions
Treatment(I): Normal Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -2.071** -1.969* 0.035 -0.806
(-2.54) (-1.84) (0.06) (-0.85)
Treatment(II): Reverse Order (1=Yes) -3.003** -2.840* 0.494 0.186
(-2.52) (-1.94) (0.74) (0.16)
Treatment(III): Reverse Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -2.300* -3.017** 1.195* 0.958
(-1.85) (-2.20) (1.77) (0.86)
Round (1-9) -0.658**** -0.664**** -0.402**** -0.484****
(-9.68) (-5.22) (-8.26) (-5.81)
Last Round (1=Yes) -0.374 -0.674 0.294 0.643*
(-1.00) (-0.90) (1.34) (1.69)
Treatment(I)*Round -0.043 0.191
(-0.25) (1.60)
Treatment(II)*Round -0.024 0.062
(-0.12) (0.44)
Treatment(III)*Round 0.140 0.048
(0.70) (0.33)
Treatment(I)*Last Round 1.023 -1.036**
(1.09) (-1.99)
Treatment(II)*Last Round -0.369 -0.031
(-0.35) (-0.05)
Treatment(III)*Last Round 0.176 -0.016
(0.15) (-0.02)
Constant 7.900** 7.963** 3.137 3.511
(2.05) (2.05) (1.04) (1.16)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 3015 3015 3015 3015
Individuals 335 335 335 335
Groups(Clusters) 87 87 87 87
R2 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: OLS random effects estimation. z-statistics in parentheses. Robust
standard errors, clustered at group level (HC) or individual level (CC). Esti-
mates for the pooled sample. Included demographic controls: age, sex, risk
aversion, correct answer to control question, reading-time, CRT-score, and
working memory score. Estimates of treatment effects are robust to the follow-
ing alternative specifications: Analyzing data at the group level, using Tobit
models, clustering all standard errors at the individual level, estimating speci-
fications from the HC and CC as seemingly unrelated regressions.
is weak evidence that subjects under time pressure converge slower in the early rounds, but
display faster convergence in the last round. Taken together we state the following results:
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Result 5: In the repeated games time pressure does not increase contributions.
Instead, it significantly reduces contributions in the normal order condition and
does not affect contributions in the reverse order condition.
Result 6: In the repeated games there is only weak evidence that time pressure
increases confusion in the CC. Furthermore, time pressure marginally affects the
rate at which confusion is reduced.
Finally, our data can shed some light on the question how deliberation and confusion interact
to shape strategic behavior in a repeated setting. This question has not been addressed by
previous time pressure experiments which have almost exclusively analyzed one-shot games. In
a typical PGG about fifty percent of participants can be classified as conditional cooperators
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Chaudhuri, 2011): they increase (decrease) their own contributions to
the public account from one round to another if (they believe that) the other group members
also contribute more (less). The one-shot evidence in Rand et al. (2012, 2014) cannot be used
to disentangle, whether time pressure affects conditional or unconditional cooperation in their
setting (Ga¨chter, 2012).16 Furthermore, related evidence from the prisoner’s dilemma (Milinski
and Wedekind, 1998; Duffy and Smith, 2014) demonstrates that constraining deliberation via
cognitive load can have an impact on strategic behavior. Specifically, these studies find that
subjects under cognitive load are less able to condition their own decisions on their partner’s
past decisions. If time pressure has similar effects, we would expect to observe less conditional
cooperation (defection) among treated subjects. To test this hypothesis and identify conditional
cooperation in our data, we follow the empirical strategies described in Croson et al. (2005),
Croson (2007), and (Ashley et al., 2010). We estimate a set of panel regressions in which we
model how individual contributions change from round t-1 to round t. This first difference in
contributions can depend on the behavior of the other group members in round t-1. In theory, a
conditional cooperator will contribute more in round t, if his contributions are below the group
average in round t-1. Similarly, he will reduce his contributions in round t, if his contributions
exceed the group average in t-1. We define two dummy variables to capture this relationship in
our regression framework.17 Subjects contributing the same amount as the group average serve
as the reference category.
Table 6 contains results from six different regressions. Specifications (1) and (2) use pooled
data from the HC. We find no evidence that changes in behavior depend on treatment assign-
ment. The significant negative coefficient of the Round variable captures a general decline in
contributions. The effects for the two main variables of interest (Above Group Average in t-1
and Below Group Average in t-1 ) point towards the presence of conditional cooperation. Sub-
jects contributing more than the group average, decrease their contributions significantly in the
subsequent round. Similarly, subjects who contribute less than the group average increase their
16Based on the strategy method, Nielsen et al. (2014) provide correlational evidence that conditional cooper-
ation is faster than defection. However, as for other correlational studies based on endogenous response times,
this relationship cannot be interpreted as causal evidence that intuition favors conditional cooperation.
17While common in the literature, one problem with this empirical strategy could be that the behavior of
other subjects cannot be seen as truly exogenous, as it might, in turn, depend on the past choices of the decision
maker. Therefore, we devise a robustness check in which we only use data from the first two rounds. In these
rounds the behavior of other subjects can be treated as exogenous, given that group composition is random.
This robustness check arrives at similar conclusions.
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Table 6: Repeated decisions: conditional cooperation
HC: Full Sample HC: Unconfused HC: Confused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions ∆ Contributions ∆ Contributions ∆ Contributions ∆ Contributions ∆ Contributions
Treatment(I): Normal Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -0.093 1.444 -0.127 2.843* 0.066 -2.046
(-0.50) (1.09) (-0.54) (1.70) (0.17) (-1.03)
Treatment(II): Reverse Order (1=Yes) -0.215 2.091* -0.084 3.466 -0.543 -1.626
(-1.03) (1.84) (-0.32) (2.75) (-1.27) (-0.85)
Treatment(III): Reverse Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -0.202 0.389 -0.175 1.720 -0.341 -2.679
(-0.87) (0.36) (-0.56) (1.50) (-0.79) (-1.38)
Above Group Average in t-1 (1=Yes) -2.912**** -1.441 -2.716**** -0.0119 -3.330**** -5.140***
(-7.20) (-1.33) (-4.63) (-0.01) (-6.98) (-2.91)
Below Group Average in t-1 (1=Yes) 1.654**** 3.302*** 1.569*** 3.887**** 1.861**** 1.447
(4.34) (3.19) (2.90) (4.35) (4.10) (0.88)
Round (1-9) -0.144*** -0.202** -0.147*** -0.217** -0.131** -0.195
(-3.28) (-2.10) (-2.74) (-1.99) (-2.14) (-1.53)
Treatment(I)*Above -2.229* -4.229** 2.109
(-1.70) (-2.57) (1.09)
Treatment(II)*Above -2.087* -4.001*** 2.395
(-1.70) (-3.28) (1.21)
Treatment(III)*Above -0.832 -2.463* 2.738
(-0.67) (-1.76) (1.47)
Treatment(I)*Below -2.099 -3.547** 1.379
(-1.58) (-2.17) (0.75)
Treatment(II)*Below -2.502** -3.327*** -0.168
(-2.23) (-3.23) (-0.09)
Treatment(III)*Below -1.700 -2.226* -0.132
(-1.46) (-1.71) (-0.07)
Treatment(I)*Round 0.101 0.142 0.0678
(0.88) (1.05) (0.38)
Treatment(II)*Round -0.0257 -0.0256 -0.0125
(-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.07)
Treatment(III)*Round 0.126 0.0704 0.182
(0.87) (0.40) (1.00)
Constant 0.719 -0.437 0.179 -1.878 2.322 2.728
(0.65) (-0.32) (0.14) (-1.34) (1.12) (0.94)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2680 2680 1672 1672 1008 1008
Individuals 335 335 209 209 126 126
Groups(Clusters) 87 87 83 83 79 79
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: OLS random effects estimation. z-statistics in parentheses. Robust
standard errors, clustered at group level. Estimates for the pooled sample.
Included demographic controls: age, sex, risk aversion, correct answer to control
question, reading-time, CRT-score, and working memory score. Main results
are robust to the following alternative specifications: estimating a Tobit model,
using continuous instead of dummy variables to capture the behavior of group
members.
contributions significantly in the following round. In line with Ashley et al. (2010), the coeffi-
cients of both variables differ in their strength. The fact that subjects react more strongly to
lower contributions of their group members could be one important factor shaping the decline in
average contributions across rounds. In specification (2) we test whether time pressure affects
subjects in their ability to condition their behavior on the choices of the other group mem-
bers. We capture these effects by interacting the treatment dummies with the main variables of
interest. The interaction terms provide weak evidence contradicting our hypothesis that time
pressure would decrease subjects’ responsiveness to the choices of other group members. Instead,
time pressure causes subjects to reduce their own contributions more strongly when observing
lower average contributions by their group members. On the other hand, subjects under time
pressure who contribute less than their group members do not increase their contributions in the
following round as much as unconstrained subjects. This second interaction effect is, however,
insignificant for the pooled sample. To confidently interpret changes in contribution behavior as
conditional cooperation, subjects should display low levels of confusion regarding the underlying
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incentive structure.18 Therefore, in specifications (3) - (6) we provide separate estimates based
on subjects’ confusion status by once more splitting the sample into two ’bins’ according to
behavior in the CC.19 Specifications (3) and (5) show that both confused and unconfused sub-
jects condition their own behavior on the past choices of their group members. A comparison of
specifications (4) and (6) reveals that time pressure selectively affects the strategic behavior of
unconfused subjects. As for the pooled sample, subjects under time pressure react more strongly
to negative experiences with their group members. Time pressure, however, does not lead to
an overall increase in conditional cooperation. Treated subjects are also more prone to exploit
the higher cooperation levels of their group members by not increasing their own contributions.
Especially this second observation contradicts an intuitive predisposition towards cooperative
behavior.
Result 7: We find no evidence that subjects under time pressure are less able to
condition their behavior on that of other subjects. They are more likely to reduce
their contributions upon a negative experience with their group members, while they
are less likely to increase their contributions after a positive experience. These
interaction effects are only present among unconfused subjects.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we pursued two objectives. First, in light of some conflicting evidence (Kocher
et al., 2012; Fiedler et al., 2013a; Tingho¨g et al., 2013; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014;
Martinsson et al., 2014a; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2016), we reinvestigate the initial claim that
a more intuitive cognitive style causes subjects in a linear PGG to behave more cooperatively
(Rand et al., 2012, 2014). Our findings from the HC condition confirm that subjects’ cognitive
style indeed affects their choices. However, the direction of the effect goes in the opposite
direction of previous findings (Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand, 2016). In our experiment, time
pressure significantly increases the share of zero contributions and weakly decreases average
contributions. This speaks against the conclusion that an intuitive cognitive style generally
favors cooperative behavior. There are several subtle design differences between our experiment
and the original studies by Rand et al. (2012, 2014). Our experiment draws on student subjects,
while subjects in Rand et al. (2012) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and are thus
more diverse in background. We use higher stakes and the time limit in our experiment is slightly
stronger. None of these differences, however, should affect the direction of the treatment effect,
if intuition was linked to cooperation in a general way as suggested by the social heuristics
hypothesis (Rand et al., 2014).
The second objective of this study was to investigate whether cognitive failure (confusion) is the
source of an important confound, when time pressure is used to investigate the link between a
18One plausible alternative explanation why confused subjects might condition their behavior on the choices
of others could be that they see these choices as containing an informative signal about the game form (Burton-
Chellew and West, 2013).
19To account for learning, we classify a subject as confused if his contributions across the nine rounds of the
CC are above those of the average subject. Results are similar if we classify subjects according to their behavior
in the final round.
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more intuitive cognitive style and cooperation in PGG. Regarding the role of cognitive failure our
results are twofold. Contrary to previous concerns, voiced in the context of response time studies
(Recalde et al., 2014), we find no evidence that forcing subjects to decide quickly increases
confusion. More precisely, the results in Recalde et al. (2014) show that faster subjects are
more prone to making an error in a non-linear public goods game (presumably because it takes
some time to calculate the optimal interior contribution level), while our results show that
exogenously speeding up decision makers does not induce more errors in a standard public good
game. This is good news for studies that use time pressure to induce more intuitive decision
making in the PGG, as this means that results such as those of Rand et al. (2012, 2014) are
not merely an artifact of inducing more confusion. Of course, our finding does not rule out
that time pressure might increase confusion or reduce decision quality in other, more complex
decision tasks. Even within the comparably simple setting of a linear PGG, behavior in the CC
closely replicates earlier studies (Houser and Kurzban, 2002) in pointing towards a substantial
presence of confusion; approximately 50 percent of subjects in our experiment contribute in
a task where contributing decreases their own earnings without providing an efficiency gain
for other participants. Based on this behavioral measure of cognitive failure we show that
confusion status is an important driver of individual heterogeneity in contribution behavior. It
affects the level of contributions and the distribution of contributions. Most importantly for the
objective of this study, confusion status is the source of a heterogeneous treatment effect: time
pressure selectively affects unconfused subjects by reducing their contributions. This is in line
with findings in Strømland et al. (2016), who also identify confusion as key moderator. This
heterogeneous treatment effect could be a key explanation for why our reinvestigation of the TP
treatment effect, along with those of others, fails to replicate and possibly contradicts the earlier
findings of the role of cognitive style on cooperation. The presence of this moderating factor
complicates the comparison of time pressure effects across different experiments, especially if
the extent of cognitive failure varies between different experimental populations. This could be
the case when drawing on non-student samples (Belot et al., 2015) or using different sets of
instructions (Ferraro and Vossler, 2010). More generally, our results highlight the importance
of cognitive failure as an understudied source of contributions in the PGG and as a potential
moderator that can affect the internal validity of experimental results. The methods we have
applied to identify confusion are easily replicable and adaptable to other designs and might
provide for a more comprehensive robustness check than non-behavioral measures of confusion.
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Appendix
Response Time Distribution
Table 7 summarizes the distribution of response times in the one-shot public good game across
the four HC.
Table 7: Response times: human condition across the different treatment and order conditions
Normal Order Reverse Order
Percentile (HC-BL) (HC-TP) (HC-BL) (HC-TP)
1% 6 4 4 2
5% 7 4 4 3
10% 8 5 5 3
25% 11.5 6 6.5 3
50% 16 7 10 4
75% 23 8 13 6
90% 33 10 18 7
95% 56 17 20 8
99% 109 25 40 26
Notes: Response time percentiles for the one-shot public good game across the
different order conditions.
Regression results: treatment effects one-shot public good game
In tobit regression models (1) and (2) of Table 8 we analyze the effect of treatment assign-
ment on contributions. Relative to observations from the normal order condition without time
pressure, subjects under time pressure contribute less under normal task order (Treatment(I):
Normal Order + Time Pressure). This effect is weakly significant at the 10 percent level. Being
assigned to the reverse order condition (Treatment(II): Reverse Order) reduces contributions,
but not significantly. Applying time pressure in the reverse order condition (Treatment(III):
Reverse Order + Time Pressure) significantly reduces contributions relative to subjects in the
normal order condition without time pressure, but not relative to subjects in the reverse order
condition (Wald Test: p=0.5545). These results continue to hold when controlling for the same
demographic variables as in Rand et al. (2012) (age, sex, ability to answer comprehension ques-
tion correctly), a survey measure of risk aversion, and several psychometric variables (time spent
on the instruction screen, CRT-score, and working memory test score). Probit regression mod-
els (3) and (4) estimate the effect of treatment assignment on the propensity to contribute zero
tokens. Again time pressure significantly increases free-riding without further control variables
and when using the same covariates as for contribution behavior.
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Table 8: Effects of treatment assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contributions Contributions Free-Riding Free-Riding
Treatment(I): Normal Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -3.256* -3.270* 0.412** 0.430**
(-1.80) (-1.83) (2.01) (2.04)
Treatment(II): Reverse Order (1=Yes) -3.384 -3.298 0.343 0.406*
(-1.61) (-1.62) (1.44) (1.67)
Treatment(III): Reverse Order + Time Pressure (1=Yes) -4.820** -5.571*** 0.594*** 0.653***
(-2.22) (-2.64) (2.60) (2.73)
Age (Years) -0.228 -0.009
(-0.86) (-0.27)
Sex (1=Male) 3.390** -0.132
(2.33) (-0.80)
Risk Aversion (1-11) 0.244 -0.008
(0.82) (-0.24)
Unconfused (1=Yes) -1.867 0.209
(-1.26) (1.25)
Cognitive Reflection Score (0-3) 1.840*** 0.055
(2.76) (0.73)
Readingtime Instructions (Log10 Sec.) 4.171** -0.165
(2.49) (-0.81)
Working Memory Score (0-12) 0.102 -0.028
(0.27) (-0.71)
Constant 12.82**** -1.407 -1.173**** -0.443
(10.01) (-0.16) (-7.50) (-0.41)
Observations 348 335 348 335
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: Specifications (1)-(2): Tobit estimation to account for censoring from below (0) and
above (20). Specifications (3)-(4): Probit estimation. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust
standard errors. Estimates for the full sample. Results are robust to using the following
alternative specifications: using only observations from the normal order condition.
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Summary Statistics
Table 9 contains summary statistics for the control variables used in all regressions above. As
expected under random assignment, there are no significant differences between the BL and
TP apart from working memory scores. This does not change when comparing slow and fast
subjects in columns (4) - (6).
Table 9: Summary statistics by time pressure and compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BL TP BL vs. TP Slow Fast Slow vs. Fast
Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) p-Value Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) p-Value
N=172 N=176 N=196 N=152
Age (Years) 22.71 (2.89) 22.83 (2.52) 0.38 22.65 (2.86) 22.93 (2.49) 0.13
Sex (1=Male) 0.46 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.58 0.46 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.53
Risk Aversion (1-11) 4.91 (2.43) 4.79 (2.37) 0.63 4.83 (2.44) 4.88 (2.34) 0.84
Unconfused (1=Yes) 0.52 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.24 0.53 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.44
Cognitive Reflection Score (0-3) 1.78 (1.10) 1.85 (1.12) 0.52 1.76 (1.12) 1.89 (1.10) 0.26
Readingtime Instructions (Log10 Sec.) 3.38 (0.38) 3.33 (0.42) 0.13 3.38 (0.41) 3.33 (0.39) 0.30
Working Memory Score (0-12) 4.64 (2.08) 5.45 (2.33) < 0.01 4.56 (2.07) 5.68 (2.30) < 0.001
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: Individual characteristics by treatment assignment and treatment compliance.
Pooled sample across order conditions. Fast subjects (Response times <= 7 seconds)
and slow subjects (Response times > 7 seconds). P-Values in (3) and (6) are from M.W.
ranks sum test for ordinal variables and from Chi2 tests for binary variables.
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Instructions
Experiment Laboratory:
Random seat assignment
Personal code for anonymity
Tasks implemented in z-Tree
• General instructions (page 35)
• Public Good Game HC (page 35)
• Public Good Game CC (page 38)
Payment according to personal code
34
General instructions
[SCREEN 1]
Dear participant, thank you for your participation. You will find general instructions concerning
the procedure of the study on this screen:
• You will work through some computerized decision tasks and questionnaires. Please always
follow the instructions on the screen in front of you. At the end of today’s session, you are
going to receive a monetary compensation. The funds for your compensation have been
provided by the Ministry of Education and Research.
• As a compensation for your participation, you will receive e 3. You will be able to earn
additional money during the experiment. The exact amounts you will earn depend, on
your own decisions during today’s session.
• Every task will be explained to you. Please read the descriptions on the screen carefully.
• Of course all your decisions as well as your personal earnings from the experiment will be
treated anonymously. The password you have created at the beginning of today’s sessions
serves to ensure this.
Introduction public good game
[SCREEN 2]
The first task is about to start. From now on please do not communicate with other participants
in the room. In case you do so, we unfortunately will have to exclude you from the study. In
this case you will not receive any compensation.
On the following screens you will find detailed instructions for the decision task. Please read
them carefully. This ensures that you will know how to influence your earnings by your own
decisions.
Instructions Public Good Game (HC)
[SCREEN 3]
Decision Task
Your main task in this study is to decide, how to divide 20 balls between two different bowls
marked with A or B. You interact with 3 other participants in this room. Thus including
yourself, there are 4 participants in a group. It will be impossible for you and all the other
participants to observe who got matched with whom. Each of the other participants can also
distribute the same number of balls (20) as yourself. You final payoff will depend on how you
and the other participants distribute the balls between the two different bowls. The rules are
identical for you and the other participants and all participants have received these instructions.
• Bowl A: Only you can fill bowl A. For each ball you put in your own bowl A, only you
receive 20 Cent.
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• Bowl B: You and the other 3 participants in your group can fill bowl B. The amount that
you and all the other participants receive from bowl B depends on the total number of
balls that are in bowl B. For each ball in bowl B you and each of the other 3 participants
receive 10 Cent each.
• The other 3 participants: Each of the participants also receives 20 balls. For each ball
that one of the other participants puts in his own bowl A, only he himself receives 20 Cent.
For each ball that one of the other participants puts in bowl B, you, he and the other two
participants receive 10 Cent each.
So the payout rules are the same for all participants.
• The final payoff: Your final payoff depends on how you and the other participants fill
the bowls. You will receive the payoff from your bowl A, as well as the payoff from the
joint bowl B.
Procedure
[SCREEN 4]
Decision Task
Part I:
Overall, you will carry out the distribution task ten times.
First, you will take a decision only once. After stating your first decision you will receive new
instructions that are only going to apply for the remaining nine decisions.
You will be matched anonymously with the same three participants in this room.
Part II:
After stating the first 10 decisions there will be a short questionnaire. After the questionnaire
you will once again complete the distribution task for another 10 times.
For that purpose you will receive again new instructions. Please read these new instructions
again carefully, as this can affect your earnings.
After the first decision round you will again receive additional instructions that are going to
apply for the remaining 9 decisions.
Your final payoff:
At the end of this study, one of the 20 decisions is going to be selected at random. The
probabilities for selecting a certain decision are the same (Like throwing a dice with the numers
1–20). Only this decision will be used to calculate your final earnings. So each decision is equally
important for your final earnings.
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Figure 6: Screenshot PGG baseline/time pressure
End Instructions
[SCREEN 5]
You have completed all instructions and examples successfully.
You are now going to begin with the first 10 decisions.
(FOR TIME PRESSURE ONLY)
You have only a limited time budget available to enter your decision.
• Your time budget for the first 5 decisions is 7 seconds.
• For the second 5 decisions your time budget is 4 seconds.
For each round in which you take longer than the time limit, 20 Cent will be deducted from
your e 3 show-up fee.
Decision Screen
[SCREEN 6]
(FOR TREATED ONLY: Counter << +1 >>)
Please indicate in the blue field how many balls you want to put in bowl B. You have to distribute
exactly 20 balls in total. All balls that you do not want to put in bowl B remain automatically
in bowl A. You are free to choose any number of balls between 0 and 20.
• Bowl A: You receive 20 cents per ball.
• Bowl B: You receive 10 cents per ball. Each of the other 3 participants also receives 10
cents per ball.
<< Entry : Contribuion(0− 20) >>
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Additional Instructions
[SCREEN 7]
Additional rules for rounds 2-10
Additional information:
From now on you will be informed after each round how many balls the other participants have
put into bowl B in total. The other participants that you interact with receive this information
as well. The feedback screen will be left after a short time (10 Sec.) and the next round begins
automatically.
Additional Decision Screens
Screens for decisions 2-10. Equivalent to screen 6.
Instructions Computer Condition (CC)
[SCREEN 8]
Description of payoffs equivalent.
Change of rules.
The other participants: As in the first 10 rounds, you will interact with three other players.
However, these players are not other participants in this room. Instead these three players are
controlled automatically by a computer program. Thus your interaction partners are no real
human beings. Each of the three computer players has (like you) 20 balls that it divides up
between bowl A and bowl B. The way the three computer players are going to divide up their
balls between bowl A and bowl B has been determined prior to you first decision. Therefore,
you cannot influence the computer players by your own choices. The contributions of the three
computer players have been written on a poster here in this room that will be uncovered after
your last decision at the end of the experiment. Thereby you can verify that the computers
indeed act according to a preprogrammed contribution sequence.
While you can earn actual money from the balls in bowl A and B, the computer players
naturally receive no earnings (as they are only a computer program)
Screen 10: Decision Screen Computer Condition
Please indicate in the blue field how many balls you want to put in bowl B. You have to distribute
exactly 20 balls in total. All balls that you do not want to put in bowl B remain automatically
in bowl A.
• Bowl A: You receive 20 cents for each ball.
• Bowl B: You receive 10 cents for each ball. Each of the other computer players “receives”
10 cents for each ball.
<< Entry : Contribuion(0− 20) >>
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Figure 7: Screenshot PGG Coputer Condition
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